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June 2008

The Hazara: Do they need to go insurgent to get their share of development?

Central Afghanistan has been the most stable and secure part of the country in the post‐Taliban phase. The majority of Central Afghans, most of whom are Hazaras, support the government and want to transition to a stable and democratic state.

Their support of the government’s thrust is key to their optimism and explains why they are also supportive of the counterinsurgency efforts of the foreign forces, the counter‐narcotics efforts, and their anti‐terrorism activities. The primary industry of Central region is agriculture, in contrast to the south, east, north and even west of Afghanistan, where narcotics production has become the chief industry. Yet, seven years after the fall of the Taliban, the peace of the Central region is now being threatened. Incidents of violence and insurgency activity are increasing.

Central Afghans who have to-date been largely supportive of the post‐Taliban government are now showing signs of increasing desperation. Why have they recently become markedly less supportive of the regime? Who is engaging in the various clashes and why? Are the citizens of Central Afghanistan headed to the same place their fellow citizens in the north, west, and south have gone, where the government has lost some forty percent of the local support?

Security situation

Since 2006, when the Taliban began resurging, the security situation in Central Afghanistan has steadily worsened. A variety of factors have contributed to the diminishing circumstances: governmental corruption, security forces that are too weak to enforce a peace allowing criminal activities to go unchecked, and infiltration by Taliban elements in the area.

The majority of the people of the central provinces – Bamiyan, Daikondi, and part of Maidan Wardak – are for the most part Hazara and Shiite, not the Taliban’s usual support base. Moreover, for years, the Hazaras have demonstrated a patient willingness to lend their support to the Karzai‐led government as it grows into the responsibilities it has been given.

The central region experienced its first major violent confrontation between the armed insurgents covered under the name of Kochis and the area’s residents in Hazarajat in 2007 when the nomadic Kochies entered the region. The encroachment of the Kochies into the traditional Hazara territory was widely perceived at the time as a hostile invasion – that is, the Kochis were perceived foreign invades unwelcomed in Hazara lands. The Hazaras lost many women and children in their confrontation with the Kochis.

As far as the Hazaras are concerned, the Kochis encroachment effectively launched whatever Hazaras violence can be seen today. Since the initial Kochi incursion into Hazaras territory, the Hazaras have since had to face an encroaching Taliban in their territory as well. Every week since then, the Taliban have managed to kill at least one Hazara in Dai Kondi, Miadan Wardak, and in Ghazni Province, the rate of Hazaras being killed by the Taliban is even higher. This is the primary reason the Hazaras are beginning to revolt against the central government: it has been unable to fulfill its most basic guarantee – the safeguard of their physical security.

Continuing lack of opportunity

In addition to the increasingly unacceptable insecurity situation of Hazarajat, the people of Central Afghanistan also feel increasingly marginalized from the central government because the region has not benefited from the government’s reconstruction efforts to the extent the other regions have. Increasingly, Central Afghans have the perception that reconstruction and economic development are tied to violence and insurgency in Afghanistan – i.e., that the government does not punish those who oppose them; rather it rewards them and punishes those who have been most reliably supportive.

Hazaras perceptions are borne out by research. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) found that Central Afghanistan (i.e., Hazarajat) experienced the lowest rate of reconstruction though it was the country’s most secure and stable region. Sima Patel, the lead author of the report, concluded that the numbers suggested Hazarajat has been deprived its share of reconstruction projects and that the situation needed to be rectified. The differences in the numbers of reconstruction projects that have benefitted Hazarajat versus the country’s other areas can be seen by touring the areas major cities – Bamiyan or Dai Koni, for example. There are no signs of any reconstruction having taken place since 2001.

A high‐ranking government official told Kabul Direct on condition of anonymity that in Dai Kondi Province, there is still no building to house the main provincial government offices, including the governor’s office. The high‐ranking official told Kabul Direct that in his view, the lack of reconstruction was not simply a case of governmental oversight but was intentional. The Attorney General of Afghanistan also expressed shock at the lack of development and poverty in Bamiyan when he recently toured the area.

The fact that government benefits have not yet extended to Hazarajat are forcing at least some Hazara to conclude that since reconstruction only seems to follow the insurgency in Afghanistan, there is no benefit to the community in maintaining its position as a stable ally of the Karzai administration. The fact that the Hazaras have yet to see any progress in road construction between Bamiyan and Kabul is a prime example of the absence of any development in the area.

The disparities in the government’s distribution of the reconstruction funds has cause at least some Hazaras to wonder if only those provinces where the Afghan National Police, the Afghan National Army, the ISAF and the coalition forces are under attack get to enjoy any reconstruction efforts, then should the Hazarajat continue to take the position of being reliable allies of the regime if it only means they will deny themselves their share of the government’s bounty?

As Husain Ali, a Bamiyan native who came to Kabul looking for work, summed up Hazara frustration to a Kabul Direct reporter: “I can’t go on like this. I need a job. I can’t find work in Iran either. What do I do?” As he concluded: “ Maybe we should wage war so that someone will understand what this is like for us.” Many Hazara, according to those who Kabul Direct interviewed for this story, are similarly frustrated. This is the type of frustration that is fueling the potential for insurgency in the region.

Nomads’ clashes and presence in Hazarajat

In April 2007, when the Nomads entered Hazarajat from Miadan Wardak Province, some ten Hazaras were killed. The Nomadic incursion led to Hazara protests in Kabul, Bamiyan, Dai Kondi, and other provinces. Some fifty thousand Hazaras were displaced during the confrontation. President Karzai ordered an investigation, but an official report was never made public if it was ever completed. The fact that the matter was thoroughly investigated has also contributed to the Hazaras sense of disenfranchisement.

In May of that same year, several high‐ranking Hazara officials had a classified gathering in Kabul to discuss how to protect the community. The officials concluded that their best chance was to withdraw from the government because the government demonstrated that it was either unwilling or unable to stop the Kochis from threatening the Hazaras in their traditional territories. The Hazaras decision was said to have alarmed President Karzai as this would mean the loss of not only the Hazara but also many Shia, upwards of some 25 percent of the population.

A year later, in 2008, the Hazaras once again came under attack from the Kochis. This time the Nomads stormed into Hazarjat from three fronts ‐ from Miadan Wardak, Ghazni and Dai Kondi. But this time, they faced an armed and ready Hazara militia as well as governmental security forces which were called to the scene. Nevertheless some ten people in the Behsud District of Miadan Wardak were killed in the skirmishes and the Kochis have yet to agree to a ceasefire.

In 2008, Hazaras have become even more vocal about the government’s inability to protect the country’s minorities. Some Hazaras elites have even gone so far as to suggest that the Kochis raids on Hazarajat must be part of some official agenda to eradicate the Hazara population.

Most Hazaras do not go that far in suspecting the government’s motives, but the government’s inability or unwillingness to protect the Hazaras has caused them to lose much of their faith in the general process of democratization in Afghanistan.

In many Hazara circles, the argument is being made that there is no benefit to the Hazara people in being supportive of the government. The logic in this argument is that given that ethnic and tribal violence are inevitably rewarded with reconstruction projects elsewhere in Afghanistan, perhaps it is the Hazaras’ support of the government that, ironically, has led to the community’s relative deprivation by the regime.

Taliban’s threats to Hazara areas

Since 2006, the number of Hazarajat districts being threatened by the Taliban has steadily increased. In the Qarabgh District of Ghazni, for example, some 20 Hazara have been killed in Taliban attacks. In April 2007, when the Taliban stopped a Hazara car to search it, and found that one of the passengers had a National Army identification card, the Taliban summarily executed the man to the horror of his friends and family who witnessed the point‐blank shooting. In additional the Taliban contribute to the sense of insecurity in Hazarajat with their by‐now routine hijacking of Hazara vehicles. Needless to say, this Taliban policy is restricting Hazara freedom of movement and economics as this impacts their ability to get their crops and other goods to market.

In the Hazara districts of Ghazni, for example, the Taliban are once again threatening Hazara families who send their children to school. The Taliban maintain the position that Hazaras schools can only open after once the Taliban come to power. Anyone caught receiving governmental salaries for any reason is warned to fear for their life. This level of insecurity could potentially drive Hazara youth and other desperate individuals to want to take up arms – not just against the Taliban and the outside insurgents but possibly even against the members of the community that still call for peace accommodation in the face of the growing crisis.

Unfortunately for the Hazaras, they have gained little from their peaceful support of the government and the coalition forces. It is time that the government of Afghanistan and the international community do something to prevent the loss of this community. If the Hazaras only represent 25 percent of Afhanistan’s total population at this point, they still represent at least 20 percent of the government’s reliable support. Who will remain standing with the government if it cannot even manage to hold on to this generally accommodating and loyal community?