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Sarwar Jawadi, Masters in Islamic Studies with specialization on Islamic movements born in Waras district of Bamiyan Province in 1968. A founder of Hekmat Social and cultural society, Mr. Jawadi was the editor in chief of Musharekat e Milli weekly. Sarwar Jawadi is a prominent expert on Afghanistan political issues who appears regularly in Afghan media. Kabul Direct interviewed him in Kabul Center for Strategic Studies offices. This is the first segment of a two-part interview.

Kabul Direct: Some experts divide the fifteen Mujahedin Sunni and Shia parties into three types ‐ the fundamentalists, the conservatives and the radicals. Do you think these divisions are accurate?

Mr. Jawadi: The Afghanistan Mujahedin can be divided along two main lines ‐ the Sunni‐dominated parties and the Shia‐dominated ones. Some of the Jihadi parties came into existence to confront ‐ religiously and politically – the regime then in power, before the codetta of Khalq (People’s Party). These religious opposition parties were heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood movement that started in Egypt but was now all over the Middle East. But in the early days, the Jihadi parties were not organized enough to really have much impact so their influenced was confined to a small circle. Because of this beginning, when we look at Sunni Jihadist parties today, parties like Jamiat Islami, Hizb‐e Islami, Itehad Islami and others, these parties have arisen from this base. So what I’m saying is that the leaders of today’s religious parties have a history of having worked together in one single entity in the early days, again, before the codetta of the communist‐backed Khalq party. And it was only later that they split into smaller parties because of personal divisions among them.

Kabul Direct: When the political differences surfaced did differences in the way they interpreted Islam intensify? For example, if we compare the so‐called fundamentalist parties ‐ the Itehad Islami led by Rasul Sayyaf, the Hizbe Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekmaytar, and the Jamieat Islami, a so‐called radical party, whose mission was to defend the rights of Tajiks. Can we say that as these parties evolved so did their concept of religion?

Mr. Jawadi: There were indeed some differences in their interpretation of Islam. But there were never very deep differences among them when it came to how they looked at religion. We do have evidence of differences in the religious fatwas (decrees) they have issued but these differences cannot really be cast as religious differences. Also bear in mind that Mr. Sayyaf was a student of Ustad Rabbani. In other words, he learned his religion from Mr. Rabbani. He was deeply influenced by Mr. Rabbani in his religious activities and ideas of revolution. But we can see that at this point they have gone in different directions.

Under the oppression of the President Sadat government in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood there had to change the way it was confronting the regime. Divide itself into several parties, and their affiliates in other Islamic countries made similar changes as well. For example, if we look at the religious perspective or point of view of Sayed Qutb in his letter other thinkers – men like Saikh Ahmad Yasin or Shiekh Omar Abdul Rahman who was prisoned by American for many years – you can see they dramatically changed their approach. They were forced to change because of the pressure from the dominate regimes. They changed their methods of resistance to survive. Any differences that have arisen are only in their agenda – how they plan to bring about an Islamic state. These differences have little to do with their interpretation of Islam.

Kabul Direct: The Afghan Mujahedin parties seem to have been heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood’s interpretation of Islam. Were the Afghanistan Muslim Brotherhood‐influenced parties also influenced by Afghan tribalism? Does this explain some of the differences the Afghan Muslim Brotherhood‐type parties experienced compared to say, their Egyptian counterparts? Do you think it may have been tribal differences that prevented the Afghan Islamist parties from being able to cohere to the point where they could bring about a stable Islamic state when they finally got their shoot at power?

Mr. Jawadi: First, I think all the Muslim Brotherhood-inspired parties everywhere deviated from their origins. Even the Islamic revolution in Iran has to change course. All Islamist parties have tried to stay remain above having tribal or ethnic differences. The goal was to revive religious values – not just in Afghanistan but also other Islamic countries as well.

If you compare the Islamic movement in Sudan, say, with the Egyptian Brotherhood or Islamic movement, and the Algerian and Moroccan movements, you can see that they all have the same roots but as time goes on, they change course.

Sayed Qutb and his colleagues had in mind the revival of Islamic values. But then look what happened to the movement in Algeria... the Islamists began slitting the throats of their fellow Muslims in villages and cities across the country. Even a woman was seen outside of her home, this became cause to kill her. No matter in which country, the Muslim Brotherhood followers have been unable to stay on the path of their original nucleus and goals.

Again, look at Iran. When Imam Khomeini started the Iranian revolution, he said his only purpose was to do as was divinely required, to fulfill his religious responsibilities. He said it wasn’t about trying to gain power. But then the system of governance he was responsible for bringing into being adopted the national interest of Iran as its primary focus. To carry out their agenda for the national interest in Iran they used religious, sectarian and whatever instruments they could use to help them accomplish their plans forthe Iranian nation.

Coming back to the Afghan Jihadi movements, they have been unable stay above letting ethnic and tribal factors influence their goals and political activities.

Kabul Direct: Now what about the Jihadi parties that started later? Have they also not been able to maintain their original vision?

Mr. Jawadi: Yes. First these other Jihadi movements include the Shia and Suuni parties, including parties which formed after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. The Jihadi parties of that era also changed course, becoming political parties with their own local agendas. These new parties were less influenced by what was happening to the Islamic parties in other countries as much as they were the domestic situation here in Afghanistan.

The Jihadi parties were widely supported by thepublic. These are the two types of Islamist parties we have in Afghanistan. I cannot see a third type evolving.

Kabal Direct: What I wanted to ask was why you thought the fundamentalist movements have largely been confined to the Pashtun‐majority parties. For example, the Hizb‐e Islami, led by Gulbuddin Hekmtyar, and the Itehad Islami, led by Abdur Rab Rasul Sayyaf. Pashtuns also seem to dominate when it comes to the conservative parties – parties such as Mahaze Milli, led by Sayed Ahamd Gailani, and Nejat Milli, led by Sibghathullah Mojaddadi. Tajiks and Hazaras, by contrast, seem to chose the radical parties - Jamieat Islami and Hizb‐e Wahdat, for example ‐ to promote their interests.

Mr. Jawadi: I don’t think one can call Hizb‐e Islami a religious fundamentalist party. They have too many ethnocentrists among their rank and file to be categorized in that group. They promote the sovereign rights of a single ethnic group in Afghanistan. And there is no room for this type of ethno‐centered platform in a fundamentalist party. The parties you mentioned in general lack the type of coherent and clear political agenda to easily label them.

In addition, the Sunni Jihadist parties change their positions based on what is going on in Pakistan. The Durand line remains the main challenge in Afghan‐ Pakistani relations. This is what has enabled Pakistan, and in particular, its Punjabi‐dominated regimes to maintain a consistent foreign policy when it comes to Afghanistan. The codetta of Afghanistan was another way Pakistan was trying to influence events in Afghanistan in its favor. Pakistan dealt with every Mujahedin party very specifically according to its national interest in Afghan affairs.

This is why politicians in Pakistan focused on the Mujahedin parties in the first place. Some of the Afghan Jihadi parties supported by the fundamentalist groups in Pakistan, Some of the Afghan parties tapped into Pakistan’s liberal parties, and so forth. Every Pakistani party had its favorite Mujahedin party, the one which best represented its interests.

During the reign of Zolfaghar Ali Butto, for example, Pakistan decided that the Pashtuns in Afghanistan were the ones who should be encouraged. So when the Jihad against the Soviets started in Afghanistan, Pakistan saw the chance to progress on its initiative. The Pakistani government used the Pashtuns, be encouraging their desire for an independent Pushtunistan to create problems for the Soviets. It was because of the way Pakistan enabled the Jihadi parties in the end that we cannot give them simple labels now.

Kabul Direct: What about the radical parties? Did not the Jamieat Islami and Hizb‐e Wahdat come major Mujahedin parties during the same time?

Mr. Jawadi: Pakistan was successful in making the Pashtun Mujahedin parties work for them. But as far as the Jamieat Islami, which is a Tajik dominated party, Pakistan was not going to have the same influence. First, because the territory of the Jamiat Islami was in the North and west of Afghanistan, areas which Pakistan has considerable less interest in. Whatever happened in these areas was not seen as potentially threatening to Pakistan. Now when Pakistan empowered the Taliban and enabled them to become the main player in Afghanistan, the other parties it was backing were allowed to go adrift. They did not stay strong.

Kabul Direct: Why did Pakistan enable the Taliban, the most radical of the fundamentalist parties? Was it because Pakistan didn’t find Hizb‐e Islami and Itehad Islami to be reliable allies?

Mr. Jawadi: This was because Pakistan could not get the Pakistani Pashtuns, the Pashtuns on the Pakistan side of the Durand line to unite and cooperate at the level they were looking for them to do.

Also, after the Soviets withdraw from Afghanistan, and the Islamic state was established, the ambitions of the

Jihadi parties grew. They were not interested in confining themselves to what mattered to Pakistan. Now they had the opportunity to deal with states as opposed to particular parties within states.

Pakistan grasped that the Pashtun parties they had supported during the Jihad were not the main players in the new state of Afghanistan. Jamiat Islami, for example, was the serious player Pakistan assumed it would not be. Moreover, Jamiat Islami focused more on building its ties with its former Soviet Union, now Russia; with Iran and, even with France, in the hopes of establishing relations with the European Union.

The Shiite parties became stronger too. With the Mujahedeen government, they were in a far stronger position than they had ever enjoyed. All this mean that now Pakistan could not just rely on its own parties when it came to Afghanistan, it had to deal with the Afghan people. These were people who though under the Taliban had lost hope with respect to Pakistan’s foreign policy toward Afghanistan. This is why Pakistan decided to become close to the Taliban.

But Pakistan’s game didn’t change. For example, Mullah Omar came from the Haraket Enqlab, a Mujahedin party. The new party, the Taliban, consisted of members of various Pashtun parties, plus some communists and Maoists, too. The Taliban came together primarily to protect the Pashtun’s ethnic interests. The Motto of the Taliban was the establishment of a Sharia‐based state, but by their nature, their policies seemed to be ethnocentric, and pro‐Pakistani.

Again, the typology of the Mujahedin parties in Afghanistan lacked a clear political and religious agenda in general. It was clear that the primary factor driving people into these parties was ethnocentric and tribal. Then of course there were the person motives ‐ the interests, attitudes and command structure which have always factored into the formation of parties and states in Afghanistan.

June 2008

The Mujahedin Movements in Afghanistan: Sarwar Jawadi Offers a Typology