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August 2008

On April 21, 2008, Islamabad signed a peace accord with some militant organizations operating in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

The 15-point peace accord ended the Third Waziristan War. The militants agreed to cease attacking the Pakistani government and security forces, respect national sovereignty, and allow NGOs to operate in the tribal territories. In exchange, Islamabad agreed to free Taliban prisoners and withdraw its forces from the militants’ territories.

Around the same time Islamabad declared peace with the militants, Pakistan’s ally, the U.S., stepped up its war. In the five months since the accords, the U.S. has carried out eleven cross-border attacks. This amounts to nearly three times the number of attacks the U.S. carried out in the five months that preceded the accords - and more than the number of attacks it carried out in the entire two year period 2006-2007.

These statistics raise an interesting question. Did Pakistan make a side deal with the U.S.? Did Islamabad make peace with the militants in part so that it could move its forces out of the way of U.S. attacks? If so, why would Pakistan have agreed to something like this?

Many observers believe that Islamabad has been insufficiently interested in getting rid of the militants because it relies on them. They point to the fact that Afghanistan is not the first place where Islamabad has used militant groups like the Taliban as its agents. Similar groups have been used in Kashmir. Pakistan also used religious extremists to fight the jihad against the Soviets. They suffered all the casualties while the Pakistani military and intelligence service got billions of dollars to manage them.

Some observers have pointed out that even were Islamabad willing to get rid of militants, it may not possess the capability. There have been recent reports, for example, that its Frontier Forces, not only disobeyed orders and backed away from confronting militants they were supposed to attack, but they may have even turned their fire on U.S. forces. If indeed Pakistan is the American ally it purports to be this would signal institutional-level insubordination.

By pulling its forces out of the way of the U.S. forces in the tribal areas, Islamabad can deflect growing suspicions that it is part of the problem. Islamabad might have done this to alleviate some of the international pressure it has been receiving and more importantly, ensure that it continues to collect the $100 million in U.S. it has been receiving each month for supposedly helping the US to prosecute the War on Terror.

Critics mock the fact that the Pakistani military has never won a war. But by using militants in the way it seems to - coupled with the outside powers reluctance to fight overt wars - the Pakistani military has grown extremely rich. Ayesha Siddiqi, author of the highly-regarded Military Inc., claims that former and high-ranking Pakistani military officials control an estimated $10-20 billion of Pakistani assets – not just defense contractors and military suppliers, either but also an airlines, hotels, shopping malls, insurance companies, banks, and farms.

One can only speculate on Islamabad’s side dealings. But what is certain is that once again Islamic radicals are bearing all the losses, while the Pakistani military reaps all the financial gains. Will the militants ever catch on to Pakistan’s game? Or are the mullahs who lead them on Islamabad’s payroll too?

U.S. Operations Inside Pakistan: Islamabad’s Peace Accords and the US Attacks Against Militants in FATA