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August 2008

Pakistan’s FATA Region: An Interview with Abdul Rashid Waziri

Abdul Rashid Waziri, a native of Paktia Province is an expert on Pakistan. He has served as a Special Advisor to and Deputy Minister of Afghanistan’s Tribal Affairs Ministry. During the reign of Dr. Najibullah, Afghanistan’s last Soviet-backed president, Mr. Waziri was the state’s key liaison with Pakistan’s FATA region. Today, Mr. Waziri serves as an advisor to the Center for Regional Studies in Kabul. Kabul Direct interviewed him at his residence northeast of Kabul.

Kabul Direct: What do you think about the recent political changes in Pakistan? How will they affect the situation here in Afghanistan?

Waziri: Afghanistan’s problems are deeply rooted on the Pakistani side of the border. For nearly three decades now, fighters have been trained, equipped and sent from Pakistan into Afghanistan.

According to Mawlana Fazul Al-Rahman’s declaration in 2005, all of the so-called mujahidin training centers in Pakistan are still active and still in the business of producing terrorists. This is why anything that happens in Pakistan is sure to affect Afghanistan.

The resignation of President Pervez Musharraf was welcomed by most Afghans. They hope that this means Afghanistan will have one less significant challenge to have to deal with. I think that any optimism related to Musharraf’s resignation is misguided, however. Most Afghans do not grasp what is really going on in the Pakistani government or it real policies when it comes comes to Afghanistan.

I don’t believe that anything that has happened indicates there will be any significant changes. The ISI will still make all the major decisions in Pakistan. Until they are removed from power, Afghans should not believe that Pakistan is going to cease interfering in the domestic politics of Afghanistan any time soon.

Kabul Direct: Do you really think it is the ISI who decides what happens inside Afghanistan? Is it the ISI in your view that governs the affairs of the government of Pakistan?

Waziri: Yes, for sure. The ISI is a department of the Pakistani army. Moreover, it serves as the right and left hand of the Pakistani military, and decides the terms of the military’s stance toward Afghanistan. You should never think of the army or the ISI as separate from the Pakistan government. It is better to think of the government as an agent of the Pakistani army, one that carries out its orders.

The ISI is the most vital and influential player in every single sphere of Pakistani society, including the government. It determines what goes on in all sectors including the political arena, the economic sector, and in the social sphere as well.

The Pakistani army is estimated to have invested some $336 billion dollars in Pakistani industries in addition to the deals it has made and its ties with various European and American companies.

Kabul Direct: As you pointed out, for many Afghans, the main issue is the extent to which Pakistan interferes in Afghanistan. What role is the ISI playing here in Afghanistan?

Waziri: As you know, Pakistan did not come into existence because of any historical, geographical or national reason. Rather, it emerged as a colonial plot to appease the so-called Islamic ideologues. In other words, Pakistan’s owes its very existence to Islamization. This is why it is so attached to radical Islamic ideologies.

This is why Pakistan has some 38,000 religious seminaries that educate four million students every year and why they have 237 religious parties, including the Hizb-ul Tabligh (The Party or Islamic Promotion), with an estimated three million members. Even today, new madrassahs are being established to propagate the views of the Taliban movement in Pakistan. Without Islamism, the very existence of Pakistan would be in question.

Look at Pakistan’s ethnic diversity. It has four major communities, including the Punjabis, the Balochis, the Pashtun, and the Sindis. The only reason these four communities have come together under the banner Pakistan is their shared religion, there is no other common denominator. Islamism is the ideological base of unity in Pakistan.

When it comes to its neighbors, Pakistan will do anything to stop the development of democratic processes because it cannot bear the idea that there should be any stable states that are actually responsive to the demands of their people. This is why Pakistan supports the Taliban the way it does. It believes that if Afghanistan transitions to a stable democracy, this will somehow threaten Pakistan. Pakistan also needs the Islamic extremists to fight its war against India, to help it keep the issue of Kashmir at the center in its dealings with India.

Kabul Direct: Are you suggesting Pakistan is using the ideology of Islamism to prevent a sense of nationalism from emerging among, say, its Pashtun population?

Waziri: Pakistan is not just interested in quashing any feelings of nationalism among its communities, it also wants to quash any democratic movement too. Pakistan believes that if Afghans can succeed in bringing about a genuine democracy, Pakistanis may think they deserve to live in a democratic state too and this would be a serious threat to the powers that be in Islamabad.

Kabul Direct: How is Pakistan able to recruit Pakistani Pashtuns to work against the interests of Afghanistan? Anything that negatively impacts Afghani Pashtuns has to have the same effect on the Pashtuns who lie on Pakistan’s side of the border. These are ties after all that go much deeper than any sense of nationalism.

Waziri: As you know, the tribal areas were created to act as a buffer region between British India and Afghanistan in 1893 and this area remained autonomous until 1992 when the mujahidin came to power in Afghanistan.

The tribal areas never developed a formal government or a security force. They were governed using tribal councils or jirgas and they used the local warlords or militias to provide security. Even in the last decades, from King Zahir Shah’s rule in the 1940s to the Mujahidin government, this was how the affairs of the tribal belt were handled. And it was an effective system too, the tribal jirgas and militias kept order in these areas.

Unfortunately the situation changed when the Mujahidin came to power in 1992. They challenged their rule and drove a wedge between the tribal leaders and the government and Pakistan seized the opportunity created by this rift and came in to try and set their agenda for the area.

Then when the Taliban was ousted in 2001, the rank and file of the movement escaped to the tribal areas. They retreated to the 700-some madrassas in the tribal areas, which of course were their ideal shelters.

The tribal elders called a jirga during this period to ban the Taliban from using the refuge as an operational base from which to fight the Afghan government and the coalition forces, but unfortunately, many of the elders who imposed this ban were then later assassinated by the Pakistan government – an estimated 250 in South Waziristan alone. The Pakistan got rid of them because it wanted the Taliban to rule over these tribal areas. The Pakistani army wanted to use the Taliban to carry out its goals for Afghanistan.

In FATA areas, it is interesting to note that the Taliban come from many communities, not just the traditional community in the region. There are also Arabs, Uzbekis, Chechens, and Kashmiris, in addition to the local Pashtu population. This has been the case since 2004, when the Taliban and Al Qaeda began recruiting in earnest in the Arab countries and Central Asia. They drew on the Uzbek fighters that had fled to Pakistan after the Andy Jan incident. Now there are an estimated 6,500 Uzbekis fighting the insurgency from Pakistan. The Kashmiri mujahidin, groups such as Jadiish-e Muhammad, Al-Badr, Sepa-e Sahaba, the Taeeba troops, Hizb-ul Mujahidin and the Harakat-ul Mujahidin use the tribal areas as a staging area for their war against India.

Now there are an estimated 67,000 insurgents in Waziristan. They are allowed free passage in and out of Pakistan. They also receive funding from the Pakistan army. Pakistani President Zardari admitted this in August when he said that only $300 million of the monthly aid the US has sent to Pakistan had gone where it was supposed to. The remaining $700 million per month, I believe, has been used to fund the Taliban and Al Qaeda insurgents.

Kabul Direct: Are you suggesting that the local people in these areas, the tribal people, do not adhere to the Taliban’s agenda, but rather the Taliban has been forced on them by the adherents of The Taliban and the Taliban enjoy support of the Pakistani army?

Waziri: Absolutely.

Kabul Direct: How is the situation in the tribal area, do the people there want to have dialogue with people on the Afghan side of the border?

Waziri: The Afghan government should try and open up a dialogue with them. They are not in a position to initiate this, as they do not have the necessary strength. They are under the control of the Taliban, Al Qaeda and Kashmiri fighters. So far the Afghan government has not taken any steps to make a dialogue happen.

Kabul Direct: What should the Afghan government have done by now?

Waziri: They should have done what Zahir Shah and Dawood Khan did before them. During their reign we never had such security problems from the Pakistani side of the border. They had the support of the tribal councils and the elders. Power was balanced in the tribal areas in those days. This is no longer the case. The Pakistani government has an active presence in the region but the Afghan government does not. The Pakistanis stepped into the vacuum and now we can see our enemies are very active and fighting against us. There are 67,000 insurgents now fighting Afghanistan. Pakistani leaders ignore or distort the public opinion of the international community. Fortunately the international community now understands that Pakistan is not combating either the insurgents or the terrorists who have taken shelter in the FATA areas.

Kabul Direct: What role are the 700 madrassahs playing in all this?

Waziri: They are still being used as refuges by the Taliban, Al Qaeda and Kashmiri fighters. As I mentioned earlier, there are 37,000 madrassas in Pakistan. Seven hundred are in the tribal areas. The madrassas are very comfortable places for the Taliban and serve as recruitment stations.

Kabul Direct: What do they teach in the seminaries?

Waziri: Faith and jihad for Allah. They train students between the ages of 12 and 15 years old. They teach them military techniques and then send them to Afghanistan to wage insurgent and suicide attacks.

Kabul Direct: Many Pakistanis are Hanafi Sunnis. Is this the interpretation of Islam that is being taught in the tribal area?

Waziri: In Pakistan there are four main schools or branches: the Wahabi, Shia, Drilawi and Deobandi schools. At this point the Deobandis have the most adherents, the Wahabis come in second place followed by the Drilawi and then the Shia in the third and fourth positions.

Kabul Direct: What interpretation of Islam is followed by the Taliban in the Tribal areas?

Warizi: The Deobandis and the Wahabi schools have the most influence among the Taliban, though the Deobandi is the most widely accepted there too.

Kabul Direct: What should Afghanistan’s policy be toward Afghanistan? How can it force Pakistan to start fighting the Taliban and stop interfering in a negative way in the tribal areas?

Waziri: The situation is already changing. The new civilian government has promised to combat the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the tribal areas. The new government has also pledged observe the terms of the peace treaty they made with the jirga last spring. They need to follow through and shut down the training, logistic and recruitment centers of the Taliban in the tribal areas. Afghanistan and Pakistan need to hold their own peace jirga.