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July 2008

Sarwar Jawadi holds is a Masters in Islamic Studies, specializing in Islamic movements. He was born in the Waras District of Bamiyan Province in 1968. He is the founder of the Hekmat Social and Cultural society and was the editor-in-chief of the weekly, Musharekat-e Milli. Sarwar Jawadi is a highly regard expert on Afghan political issues and his opinions are widely sought by the Afghan media. Kabul Direct interviewed him in Kabul Center for Strategic Studies offices. This is the second of a two-part interview.

Kabul Direct: When the Taliban first emerged in Afghanistan, it was different from the other Islamist movements in Afghanistan at the time because the Taliban were from the Deobandi school of Islam. Do you agree that the Taliban was different from the other Islamist parties in because of the movement’s origins?

Mr. Jawadi: There is no doubt that the Islamist movements had ideological differences right from the beginning. But in my estimation, such differences in interpretation of Islam we not the factors that ultimately divided them. For example, Jamiat- Islami was influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood. But there are fundamental differences in, say, the role they foresaw for women in society, and their views were different from the other Muslim Brotherhood offshoot, the Hizb-e Islami.

Kabul Direct: Perhaps I should rephrase my question. It seems to me that the Muslim Brotherhood and the Deobandi have distinctly different interpretations of the role Islam should play in politics. Do you see the same dichotomy? Do you see the main promoters and Deobandism – i.e., Jamiat-e Ulemi Islam and Jamiat-e Ulema are promoting a Deobandism vision for Afghanistan like the Taliban is?

Mr. Jawadi: Well, there are major differences between the Deobandi school of India and the Deobandi school in Pakistan, that is the school in Peshawar. Then there is the contradictory role the Pakistani Deobandi leaders play in Pakistan versus the role they play in Afghanistan. For example, in Pakistan, Deobandi leaders never carry out hostile activities against women or their activities in Pakistan, and they even allow Pakistani women to enter the political arena. But in Afghanistan, on the other hand, the Deobandis won’t allow Afghan women to even leave their homes without male escorts.

I believe such differences are less religious than they are political. They take the form they do to conform to the political games they are playing. In general, I believe that all sectarian differences in Islam can be traced to political motives as opposed to differences of interpretation or religious doctrine. The same forces that direct the major political parties and movements direct our Islamist movements as well. We even see the same players in many cases.

We also saw something analogous during the time when every communist party was backed by the Russians and then on the other side, the Americans would always support any liberation movement that claimed to want democracy and justice.

The Islamist parties and movements may have started as genuine Islam-based movements but as soon as they became politically motivated they changed. It was only in the early days, when they were conceived by people like Sayeed Jamal Afghani and Sayed Qutb and Hasan Al Banna, that they were true Islamic movements. Sayed Qutb never entered politics – he only wrote books on Islamic issues. Then once they were clamped down on by the totalitarian regimes that gave rise to them in the first place, they evolved into political parties in order to survive.

They needed to become political parties to be able to win support of the governments and states that hosted them. It was at this point that their agenda changed – when the host governments and states began to impose their own objectives and goals on the movements in exchange for their support.

We saw the same evolution in Afghanistan’s Mujahedin parties. Like the Islamist parties, they too became political parties after they got interested in power and can no longer be considered pure liberation movements. They have assumed, shall we say, more practical positions.

Kabul Direct: So what is your concept of the typology of the Mujahidin parties?

Mr. Jawadi: Well, it is difficult to make a blanket statement about the Mujahedin parties. One cannot say, for example, that they are all one-hundred per cent liberal, or radical or communitarian. Some Afghan Mujahedin parties may correctly be termed liberal. These are the modern ones – though they can also be described as fundamentalist parties too. It is not impossible to be modern and fundamentalist at the same time because their members do not see modernism as being in any kind of fundamental conflict with a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam.

These modernist parties are the ones that are fine with women participating in the political sphere. They way they see it, women’s participation in society in no way contradicts the teachings of Islam. The modernist fundamentalists are the people that believe that the Islamic state is one that fulfills the aspirations and desires of all the people who inhabit the state. These are the fundamentalists that promote the national interests of Afghanistan above the interests of any special group or sect.

Kabul Direct: Which parties in particular are you referring to?

Mr. Jawadi: I refer to the Shia parties. Over the past four decades, the Shia parties in Afghanistan have never acted against the national interest of Afghanistan. They have never put the interest of any third party above their interests or the interests of the Afghan people. They have demonstrated a willingness to accommodate the political and social changes that have occurred in Afghanistan. They have no history of putting their own communitarian or sectarian needs or interests ahead of the nation’s.

The Sunnis also have parties which can be described as both modern and fundamentalist – and because of their open-mindedness. The Hizb-e Islami (Islamic party), for example. Consider the number of Hizb-e Islami leaders who have willingly put the nation’s interest above their own. The leaders of the Hizb-e Islami also believe that Islam is entirely compatible with a modernist approach to government and the structuring of society.

The other Sunni parties who are also modern yet fundamentalist include the Jamiat-e Islam, and the Junbish-e Milli Party of Afghanistan. The Junbish is not only liberal but also count leftists as well Islamists among its members. This is the party that used to be under the command of General Abdul Rashid Dustum. In Junbish-e Milli, you find Mawlawis and Mullahs sitting next to leftists who were active in government during the communist era of Afghanistan. The party also has Afghans who have returned home after many years of living in exile in Western countries. The organizing principle among most members of the Junbish e Milli is ethnocentric.

Now Sunni Afghans have other parties too, but unfortunately most cannot be counted as either liberal or Islamist parties because most cannot get past placing their own narrow sectarian and communitarian interests above their fellow Afghans and fellow Muslims. To them, the national interest means nothing if it is not compatible with or subordinate to their narrow ethnocentric goals and objectives.

So when we talk about the typology of the Mujahedin parties, there are the liberal and open-minded parties among them, the parties that are able to place the national interest of Afghanistan at the top of their political agenda, and the parties which see Islam as entirely compatible with modernism. These are the parties that do not see religion as a basis on which to be hostile – and they do not see modernity as something they need to oppose. Such movements are found among both the Sunni and the Shia communities.

The second type of Afghan Mujahedin party is comprised of those parties where ethnicity and sect are the organizing bases of the party. In these parties, the goal is to make sure that the party’s sect or ethnic group emerges on top politically. I must add, however, that a certain amount of ethnocentricity can be found in every movement in Afghanistan. Many Afghans are still unable to get past thinking past their ethnic or sectarian differences.

I believe that many Pashtun parties are driven by those who want the Pashtuns to continue to dominate the politics of Afghanistan. Though some of these party’s members may also be liberals and/or fundamentalists, it is their Pashtun nationalism that is their primary political motivation.

Kabul Direct: So how would you describe the current stage of the Mujahedin movements? Will the Mujahedin movements yield to their ethnocentric or sectarian impulses or are they getting past them?

Mr. Jawadi: The jihadi parties are not controlling Afghanistan at the moment so they have not been able to play either a very positive or a very negative role. The Mujahedin movements have had to evolve into larger movements.

The Shia political parties, or the Shia politicians rather, along with their Tajik and Uzbek colleagues have tried to promote and support the new constitution of Afghanistan. Our interpretation of what the Afghan constitution means is based on the belief that with this type of constitution , Afghanistan can finally enter the modern world. Whether the modern world means liberalism or liberal democracy – or Islamism or an Islamic state – the Shia parties, along with their Tajik and Uzbek counterparts, believe that for the first time in the modern history of Afghanistan (the past three centuries), Afghans finally have the opportunity to live in a state where the rule of law can prevail. As opposed to having to live in a state where it was only the ruler who could decide what was the law and what was not and who would have to live under this law.

With a constitution, Afghans can now benefit from being able to live inside a structure where the law will apply to everyone. This is what the constitution means to those of us who believe in what it represents. On the other side, there are those who will never care about having a constitution in Afghanistan, or that there be an equal application of the law. These are the people who only think about reclaiming or gaining power for their own ethnicity. Those in this group do not even care about ideological differences - for example, they never stop to ask whether fellow ethnics are Islamists or communists, or whether they are liberals or technocrats, they can even be Taliban. The only thing that matters to this way of thinking is someone’s ethnicity.

Kabul Direct: So how do we deal with the situation we are now in?

Mr. Jawadi: I think the public needs to be educated about their fundamental rights. This can be done through the mass media, through civil societies, and through influential community leaders. Once the public understands that they have basic rights, that they should be able to expect to be treated equally under the law, for example, they will see the benefits that this new constitutional order can bring them. Once they learn about their rights, they will never allow any one, not even the most popular or powerful leader to place himself above the law.

I was in Sweden once, which has been very successful in combating the corruption. When I asked them how they were able to do this, they told me that it was because they have a free media. They never said that they could combat this phenomenon because they are a powerful police force or because their government employees have high salaries. They said it was because they have a free press.

I think whenever the media is weak and dependent on the whims of a leader or it caters to special interest groups, the public will always live in ignorance. What we now need to have along with our constitution is an independent, free and unbiased media. We need to have a media that will investigate any kind of illegal activity, any corrupt official, any kind of criminality. And while we build the foundations of our new institutions, and at last bring law to all Afghans, we must build bridges and connections between all of our different ethnic groups.

The Mujahideen Movements in Afghanistan: Sarwar Jawadi offers a Typology