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July 2008 |
Current Trends in Ghazni Province: An Interview with Shah Gul Rizaie |
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Shah Gul Rizaie is a member of the Afghan parliament representing Ghazni province. Previously she was the director of a girls’ high school in the Jaghori district of Ghazni. She is also a student in the Law Faculty at Kabul University. Kabul Direct interviewed her at her Kabul residence.
Kabul Direct: How do you asses the general security situation in Ghazni province? Ms. Rizaie: Compared to recent years, Ghazni’s security situation is worse than ever. The insecurity is widening too, now many spheres of life are affected. First, take the number of insurgent attacks in the province, particularly in and around Ghazni city. Up to the last year, Ghazni city never experienced attacks. Now there have been several attacks per week. Second, the insurgents now appear to be focused on capturing districts. For example, a month ago, the Ajristan district fell into the hands of the Taliban. Then two weeks back, the Nawa district was captured. Third, the insurgency and insecurity are acting to connect the districts of Ghanzi. The main focus of the Taliban and the insurgents is on the road connecting the Qarabagh and Jaghori districts. This is the main road going through the Qarabagh, Jaghori, Nahor, Malistan, Ajristan, and even the Khas Oruzgan districts. The insurgents and various criminal groups are killing people and then stealing their cars or motors. In the past year, some 150 cars have been stolen. Kabul Direct: What are the reasons behind all this new insecurity and insurgency in Ghazni? Why has the sudden increase in insecurity in the province? Ms. Rezaie: Part of the problem in Ghazni can be traced to what is going on elsewhere in Afghanistan. Kabul Direct: But why specifically are we seeing insurgent activity in Ghazni? Ms. Reziae: I believe it is related to the central government’s lack of interest in the provincial administration of Ghazni. Ghazni does not yet have well-established governmental institutions or officials who can carry out their duties well at this point. For example, last year, the government announced that a specific number of police forces would be assigned to the Ghazni province. But to date, the numbers of police deployed to the province are not anywhere near what was promised. At some check posts for example, there was expected to be 70 police but the reality is that there are only 30-40 to date. This is one indication of the government’s inability to carry out effective programs in the province. Then there is the lack of coordination between the local officials and the central government. In the past two years, Ghazni has had five different governors. Each time the governor was replaced, the new governor was still unable to resolve the problems. Part of the problem lies in the fact that the problems have not been carefully identified. Kabul Direct: While you suggest that government has not taken enough interest in the affairs of Ghazni, the fact that the governor and police chief of the province have been changed so many times seems to indicate that at least some attention is being paid to what happens in Ghazni. Ms. Rezaie: Well, there has indeed been some attention paid to the province, at least to what is happening at the highest ranks of the provincial government. And now the central state is widening its scope to include the lower ranks too, the ranks that are vital to the security and development of this province. During the past five years when no changes were made in any of the district administrations in Ghazni contributed to the problems we have now. We needed to improve on our local administration, check post controls and coordination between the various offices in order to bring the situation under control. Kabul Direct: A key component of this is how the citizens feel about the government. How do the people of Ghazni view the government? Are they increasingly optimistic or pessimistic? Ms. Rezaie: I think the extent to which the people of Ghazni support Afghan government depends on which area of government we are talking about. If we talk geopolitically, most districts of Ghazni have supported the efforts of the central state. For example, in Jaghori, parts of Qarabagh, Nahor, Malistan and Jighato, and Khaja Omari people feel secure and thus they are completely supportive of the government. But in the districts where people feel insecure, there is more anti-government sentiment. In some parts of Ghazni, people who have been supportive of the government, but feel this support has not gained them any advantage because they do not see the government as having benefitted them, are increasing less supportive. In Jaghori and Malistan, for example, people who were positive about the government, but who have since lost their young people to the insurgency, or who have had their cars stolen are growing pessimistic. They see the government as having done nothing for them. I am aware of the problems the Afghan government faces - its weak economic condition; its dependence on foreign countries and many other issues. Kabul Direct: Which are the most volatile and which are the most supportive districts? Rezaie: The most volatile are the districts where the Taliban has bases, either for domestic reasons or foreign issues. Kabul Direct: Let’s talk about who is enabling versus who is driving the insurgency in Ghazni. There seem to be three main groups in the insurgency in Afghanistan: Hizbe Islami; Al Qaida; and the Taliban. In Ghazni province, who are the active players? Ms. Rezaie: It is difficult to differentiate between these groups. They all act along the same lines, for example. I do think that the most secure areas in Ghazni are those where the majority are Hazara. Kabul Direct: What about the recent reports of the Taliban threatening to close down schools in Ghazni? Ms. Rezaie: Yes, many schools have had to close in Ghazni, but not in the Malistan or Jaghori districts. Other districts have had to close their schools under fear of attack, even in Ghazni city there are reports of schools that have had to close. Kabul Direct: What about the security situation on the roads that connect the districts. Where are the threats coming from? Ms. Rezaie: The Gelan- Jaghori road has become completely insecure. The Taliban is routinely menacing traffic on this road. The road connecting Qarabagh to Jaghori has also become very volatile. Travelers on this road have to fear for their personal security. It is becoming increasing difficult to move around. The Taliban are not the only ones menacing travelers on these roads. There are also the criminal groups who are in the business of armed theft, kidnapping and murder for ransom. A source of this problem can, unfortunately, be traced to the political vision of the provincial officials. Some Ghazni officials believe that if they are fighting the insurgency in one district they can ignore what is happening in their other districts. Just because you may be trying to counter the insurgency one place does not mean that you can ignore what is happening in the rest of your jurisdiction. Kabul Direct: If you compare the situation in Ghazni to the situation in Helmand, would you say Ghazni is at risk of becoming another Helmand? Ms. Rezaie: I’m not at that point. We still have time to secure Ghazni and reverse the deterioration. But I suppose that if the situation is ignored much longer, it could become another Helmand. Kabul Direct: Is there any logic to idea that the key to attracting development in a province is to raise the level of insecurity? People are saying this is why Helmand gotten so many more development projects than, say, Ghazni has. Are development projects being used to fight the insurgency in your view? Ms. Rezaie: I think that the link between construction activity and security conditions has not been proven. Development can only be productive when the time is right. Construction compliments security, it does not cause security. And where there is security, there is opportunity for development. Where development is going on the general attitude toward government does seem to become more positive. In some cases, it does seem that that construction projects have been used to bring an end to the insurgency. But I think this has to be carefully examined. The government should not be in the position of granting construction projects when it will make it seem as though the government is somehow rewarding the insurgents. Bamiyan has been one of the country’s most secure provinces. If the government alloted Bamiyan some construction projects, I think the province could become an example of the type of benefits that could be expected as provinces became secure. This is what should be the model for other provinces. In other words the message that should be being conveyed is that those provinces that are able to achieve security should expect to be rewarded. Unfortunately the opposite message is being sent. Increasingly it seems like the surest route to development is to became a center of the insurgency. Kabul Direct: What can Ghazni do to change its situation? Ms. Rezaie: First, Ghazni should have the option is put in place a provincial administration to be able to control its own rank and file and districts and properly coordinate its activities. We also need to be more clear about the issues that affect us. We need to agree on our planning objectives and carry out a plan. We won’t change the situation without a well-orchestrated and coordinated plan. Copyright 2008 Kabul Center for Strategic Studies. All rights reserved. |
